As reported by SecurityAffairs, Enea has published research identifying two threat actors — SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA — operating inside mobile network operators (MNOs) to intercept subscriber communications and move laterally between networks. The findings underscore a long-known but critically under-addressed reality: the trust-based architecture of global telecom signalling is a persistent attack surface that nation-state actors are actively weaponizing.

Threat Intelligence: As reported by SecurityAffairs, Enea has published research identifying two threat actors — SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA — operating inside mobile network operators (MNOs) to intercept subscriber communications and move laterally between networks.

The Core Problem: Trust Without Verification

Mobile networks rely on inter-operator signalling protocols — SS7, Diameter, and GTP — exchanged over the IPX (IP Exchange) network to enable roaming, SMS delivery, and call routing. These protocols were designed in an era when telecom operators implicitly trusted each other. That assumption no longer holds. Attackers who gain a foothold on one operator's infrastructure can leverage that trusted position to probe, surveil, or compromise other interconnected networks and their subscribers.

Enea's detection of GTPDoor — a Unix-based implant using GTP-C protocol for covert command-and-control — is particularly significant. By blending malicious traffic into legitimate signalling flows, GTPDoor evades conventional network security monitoring. Palo Alto Networks previously linked this activity to cluster CL-STA-0969, which CrowdStrike tracks as LIMINAL PANDA with suspected ties to China's Ministry of State Security.

Scale and Scope

The trust model underpinning global mobile roaming is effectively a supply chain problem — compromise one operator, and you gain a staging ground against the entire interconnected ecosystem.

Enea reports 5 to 10 confirmed or strongly suspected infected operators, with estimates of potentially several dozen compromised networks worldwide — concentrated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Several hundred covert GTP sessions were blocked in the first quarter of 2026 alone. SilentAir, a newly identified actor, has been operating since before 2025, and a connection to LIMINAL PANDA remains possible but unconfirmed.

The geographic concentration is telling. Operators in regions with less mature cybersecurity postures, lower regulatory scrutiny of telecom infrastructure, and fewer dedicated signalling security controls face the highest exposure. However, the interconnected nature of global roaming means subscribers of well-defended operators can still be targeted if their traffic transits compromised networks abroad.

Why Traditional Defenses Fall Short

Scale and Scope
Firewalls and EDR don't see signalling traffic: GTP, SS7, and Diameter operate in network layers most enterprise security tools were never designed to inspect.
Trust inheritance: An attacker inside one MNO can send seemingly legitimate signalling messages to peer networks, bypassing authentication assumptions.
Covert C2 channels: GTPDoor demonstrates how protocol-specific implants can hide command traffic inside legitimate-looking signalling sessions.
Subscriber surveillance at scale: Once inside, attackers can intercept SMS (including 2FA codes), track location, and potentially redirect calls — affecting not just the compromised operator but any subscriber whose traffic transits that network.

Shield53 Recommendations

For Mobile Network Operators

  • Deploy dedicated signalling firewalls: SS7, Diameter, and GTP firewalls are not optional — they are the perimeter for telecom infrastructure. Ensure rules are tuned to detect anomalous inter-network signalling, unexpected GTP tunnel creation, and covert session patterns.
  • Segment signalling infrastructure: Isolate IPX-connected systems from internal management and subscriber data networks. GTPDoor's ability to launch SSH and pivot internally indicates weak segmentation at affected operators.
  • Monitor GTP-C for anomalies: Look for unexpected Create Session requests, unusual tunnel endpoints, GTP-C messages that don't correspond to legitimate subscriber activity, and low-volume periodic sessions that may indicate heartbeat/check-in behavior.
  • Conduct threat hunting on signalling systems: Search for GTPDoor indicators, unauthorized binaries on Unix-based network elements, unexpected SSH sessions on GPRS gateways or S-GW/P-GW nodes, and anomalous outbound GTP connections.

For Enterprises and Regulated Industries

  • Assume SMS-based 2FA is compromised: If your organization relies on SMS for authentication, these attacks reinforce the urgent need to migrate to app-based or hardware-based MFA. Nation-state actors inside telecom networks can intercept SMS at the signalling layer.
  • Brief executive and security leadership: Telecom infrastructure compromise is an existential risk for organizations in defense, government, financial services, and critical infrastructure. This threat should inform supply chain risk assessments and vendor due diligence.
  • Monitor for downstream indicators: If subscribers report unexpected SMS delivery failures, call drops, or location-tracking anomalies, consider whether compromised roaming partners may be involved.

Broader Implications

The SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA campaigns reinforce what telecom security researchers have warned for a decade: the signalling layer is a live battlefield. The difference in 2026 is operationalization. These are not proof-of-concept demonstrations — they are sustained, multi-year intrusions with surveillance objectives and nation-state fingerprints.

The telecom industry must treat inter-operator signalling with the same zero-trust rigor now applied to enterprise IT. That means signalling firewalls, continuous monitoring, protocol anomaly detection, and information sharing among operators through organizations like GSMA's ISAC. Operators that continue to rely on inherited trust are not just risking their own subscribers — they are becoming vectors in a global surveillance supply chain.