As reported by SecurityAffairs, cognitive warfare has crystallized as a defining threat vector of 2026, with the European External Action Service documenting a 259% year-over-year surge in AI-attributed foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) incidents — from 41 cases in 2024 to 147 in 2025. Twenty-seven percent of all incidents analyzed in 2025 involved AI-generated techniques. This is not a future concern; it is an active, accelerating operational landscape.

Threat Intelligence: As reported by SecurityAffairs, cognitive warfare has crystallized as a defining threat vector of 2026, with the European External Action Service documenting a 259% year-over-year surge in AI-attributed foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) incidents — from 41 cases in 2024 to 147 in 2025.

At Shield53, we view cognitive warfare as the convergence point where information security, psychological operations, and generative AI meet traditional cyber tradecraft. The distinction from conventional disinformation is critical: cognitive warfare doesn't aim to sell a single narrative — it aims to erode the audience's capacity to distinguish truth from fabrication at all. That is a fundamentally different defensive problem, and most security programs are not architected for it.

The AI Multiplier Effect Is Now Measurable

The EEAS data matters because it quantifies what analysts have long suspected: generative AI has collapsed the cost and time barriers to producing convincing synthetic content at scale. Deepfake audio can impersonate executives. Synthetic video can fabricate statements from heads of state. Coordinated bot networks can simulate grassroots consensus across dozens of languages in near real-time. When a threat actor can produce 147 distinct campaign artifacts where 41 existed before — with automated translation, synthetic imagery, and amplified influencer coordination — the defensive surface hasn't merely expanded. It has qualitatively transformed.

Who Is at Risk

  • Government and defense organizations — Cognitive warfare targets democratic decision-making processes, election integrity, and public trust in institutions. Defense and intelligence agencies face operational security risks when their own personnel are targeted with personalized influence content.
  • Critical infrastructure operators — Disinformation about power grid failures, water contamination, or public health emergencies can trigger panic responses that are themselves the attack vector — overwhelming 911 dispatch, emergency communications, and crisis response systems.
  • Corporate leadership and boards — Deepfake impersonation of executives for market manipulation, extortion, or reputational sabotage is now technically accessible to commodity threat groups, not just well-resourced state actors.
  • Financial markets — Coordinated disinformation timed with trading windows can trigger flash crashes. The 2025 trend data suggests adversaries are refining their operational tempo and market-awareness.

Why This Is a Security Problem, Not a Communications Problem

The most dangerous cognitive warfare campaigns are those where the target never realizes manipulation occurred. By the time a correction is issued, the damage — to trust, to decision-making, to institutional credibility — is already done.

Security teams frequently treat information operations as a public relations or communications issue. That is a misclassification. Cognitive warfare campaigns are often enabled by the same technical infrastructure as cyber intrusions: compromised social media accounts, credential abuse, automated posting infrastructure, and C2-style coordination protocols for bot networks. The tradecraft overlaps. The defenders should too.

Shield53 Recommendations

Defending against cognitive warfare requires extending security programs beyond the network perimeter into the information environment itself:

Shield53 Recommendations
Deploy deepfake detection tooling across media monitoring pipelines. Invest in solutions that analyze audio and video artifacts for synthetic generation signatures — do not rely on human spotting alone, as detection lag is already measured in hours and deepfakes are improving faster than unaided perception can adapt.
Establish verification protocols for high-impact communications. Any statement attributed to executive leadership, emergency services, or government officials that reaches critical audiences should require out-of-band confirmation through pre-established secondary channels.
Monitor for impersonation and brand abuse as security incidents. Treat fake accounts impersonating your organization or leadership as security events, not reputation issues. Integrate social media monitoring into your SOC playbook with defined escalation thresholds.
Build organizational media literacy into security training. Train personnel — especially those in roles handling sensitive information or crisis communications — to recognize cognitive warfare tactics. Tabletop exercises should now include disinformation scenarios alongside traditional incident response scenarios.
Map your information supply chain. Identify which third-party accounts, influencers, and media outlets your organization amplifies or relies on. Adversaries target these intermediaries precisely because trust transfers implicitly and corrections rarely reach the same audience.
Integrate FIMI threat intelligence feeds. EEAS, CISA, and allied agencies are publishing real-time indicators of foreign information manipulation. Route these into your threat intelligence platform alongside traditional IOCs.

The 259% growth rate in AI-attributed information manipulation is not a trend line — it is an inflection point. Organizations that continue treating cognitive warfare as someone else's problem will find their decision-making environments already compromised by the time they recognize the threat. The window for building defensive capability is now, while adversaries are still scaling.