As reported by SecurityAffairs, cognitive warfare has crystallized as a defining threat vector of 2026, with the European External Action Service documenting a 259% year-over-year surge in AI-attributed foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) incidents — from 41 cases in 2024 to 147 in 2025. Twenty-seven percent of all incidents analyzed in 2025 involved AI-generated techniques. This is not a future concern; it is an active, accelerating operational landscape.
At Shield53, we view cognitive warfare as the convergence point where information security, psychological operations, and generative AI meet traditional cyber tradecraft. The distinction from conventional disinformation is critical: cognitive warfare doesn't aim to sell a single narrative — it aims to erode the audience's capacity to distinguish truth from fabrication at all. That is a fundamentally different defensive problem, and most security programs are not architected for it.
The AI Multiplier Effect Is Now Measurable
The EEAS data matters because it quantifies what analysts have long suspected: generative AI has collapsed the cost and time barriers to producing convincing synthetic content at scale. Deepfake audio can impersonate executives. Synthetic video can fabricate statements from heads of state. Coordinated bot networks can simulate grassroots consensus across dozens of languages in near real-time. When a threat actor can produce 147 distinct campaign artifacts where 41 existed before — with automated translation, synthetic imagery, and amplified influencer coordination — the defensive surface hasn't merely expanded. It has qualitatively transformed.
Who Is at Risk
- Government and defense organizations — Cognitive warfare targets democratic decision-making processes, election integrity, and public trust in institutions. Defense and intelligence agencies face operational security risks when their own personnel are targeted with personalized influence content.
- Critical infrastructure operators — Disinformation about power grid failures, water contamination, or public health emergencies can trigger panic responses that are themselves the attack vector — overwhelming 911 dispatch, emergency communications, and crisis response systems.
- Corporate leadership and boards — Deepfake impersonation of executives for market manipulation, extortion, or reputational sabotage is now technically accessible to commodity threat groups, not just well-resourced state actors.
- Financial markets — Coordinated disinformation timed with trading windows can trigger flash crashes. The 2025 trend data suggests adversaries are refining their operational tempo and market-awareness.
Why This Is a Security Problem, Not a Communications Problem
The most dangerous cognitive warfare campaigns are those where the target never realizes manipulation occurred. By the time a correction is issued, the damage — to trust, to decision-making, to institutional credibility — is already done.
Security teams frequently treat information operations as a public relations or communications issue. That is a misclassification. Cognitive warfare campaigns are often enabled by the same technical infrastructure as cyber intrusions: compromised social media accounts, credential abuse, automated posting infrastructure, and C2-style coordination protocols for bot networks. The tradecraft overlaps. The defenders should too.
Shield53 Recommendations
Defending against cognitive warfare requires extending security programs beyond the network perimeter into the information environment itself:
The 259% growth rate in AI-attributed information manipulation is not a trend line — it is an inflection point. Organizations that continue treating cognitive warfare as someone else's problem will find their decision-making environments already compromised by the time they recognize the threat. The window for building defensive capability is now, while adversaries are still scaling.