As reported by The Hacker News, ConnectWise has confirmed that attacks against on-premises ScreenConnect deployments remain active, with threat actors deploying a multi-component toolkit dubbed SCKit to compromise managed service provider (MSP) environments. The campaign exploits unpatched systems and leverages third-party extensions to gain footholds, then spreads laterally via a worm-like mechanism targeting technician workstations.
Vulnerability Details
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-84869 |
| CVSS | 9.9 (Critical) |
| Affected Product | ConnectWise ScreenConnect (on-premises), technician client versions prior to 26.6.5; also affects RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 (authentication bypass) |
| Vulnerable Components | Five third-party extensions: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link |
| Patch Available | Yes — update technician client to version 26.6.5 or later |
| Active Exploitation | Yes — Huntress reported a spike on Nov 13, 2026, impacting 205 hosts across 41 organizations |
| Threat Actor Infrastructure | 185.241.211[.]197 (1337 Services GmbH, bulletproof hosting) |
Why This Matters
This is a supply chain compromise at the MSP layer — and it is exceptionally dangerous. ScreenConnect is the connective tissue between an MSP and every customer environment it manages. A worm-like payload that jumps from an infected customer endpoint to the technician's workstation during a support session can cascade compromise across dozens of downstream networks from a single initial foothold. The RelayTrap C# module is specifically designed to exploit CVE-2026-84869 to silently execute code on technician machines when they connect to triage an infected device — turning the very act of incident response into the vector for lateral spread.
The most insidious aspect: defenders investigating a suspected compromise on a customer endpoint can themselves become patient zero for the next wave of infections.
ConnectWise has already disabled the five flagged extensions across 400 partner environments, but the presence of those extensions alone doesn't confirm compromise. The broader risk is the large population of on-premises deployments that have not yet patched — a population that threat actors are actively scanning and targeting.
Who Is Most at Risk
Persistence Indicators to Hunt For
Huntress identified a specific persistence mechanism that defenders should immediately scan for across their estate:
- Rogue service:
Windows Update Agent(masquerading as a legitimate Windows component) - Executable:
UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe - Path:
C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\ - Runs as:
LocalSystem(maximum privileges) - Network IOC: Connections to
185.241.211[.]197
Shield53 Recommendations
Immediate Actions
- Patch now: Update all ScreenConnect technician clients and on-premises servers to version 26.6.5 or later. This is non-negotiable — the CVSS 9.9 flaw allows unauthorized file transfer and execution through active sessions.
- Disable flagged extensions: Immediately disable Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link. Verify they are disabled across all on-premises instances, not just the primary server.
- Hunt for persistence: Run enterprise-wide scans for the
Windows Update Agentservice, theUpdateConnect.ClientService.exebinary, and thede362a425905bcc4directory hash string. EDR queries should also check for any service named to impersonateWindows Update Agent. - Block known IOCs: Add
185.241.211.197to network-level blocklists and SIEM detection rules. Monitor firewall and proxy logs for any historical or active connections to this address. - Audit technician workstations: Given the worm-like RelayTrap mechanism, every technician machine that has connected to a customer endpoint since early November should be treated as potentially compromised. Run full EDR sweeps, check for anomalous service creation, and review PowerShell/C# compilation activity.
- Review session logs: Examine ScreenConnect session logs for unusual file transfers, unauthorized command execution, or sessions initiated from unexpected source IPs.
Longer-Term Hardening
- Segment MSP management networks: Technician workstations should not have unrestricted access to all customer environments simultaneously. Zero-trust segmentation limits worm propagation.
- Enforce extension allowlisting: Disable the ability for technicians to install third-party extensions without security review. The five flagged extensions were the entry point — this attack class will recur with new extensions.
- Implement jump host architecture: Route all remote support sessions through hardened, disposable jump hosts that are rebuilt regularly. This breaks the technician-to-customer infection chain.
- Monitor for service creation masquerading: Deploy detection rules for services using names of legitimate Windows components but located in non-standard paths like
C:\ProgramData\.
The SCKit campaign underscores a recurring truth about the MSP ecosystem: the tools used to manage and protect customer environments are themselves high-value targets. Patching is the minimum bar — the real defense is architectural. Until MSPs treat their RMM infrastructure as a hostile attack surface rather than a trusted toolset, campaigns like this will continue to find fertile ground.